IDF probe: Camp Urim unprepared, 8 killed in October 7 attack

IDF investigation reveals Camp Urim was not ready for large-scale terror assault during Hamas’ October 7 rampage; eight soldiers fell, critical defense failures were exposed.

A comprehensive investigation into the battle at Camp Urim during Hamas’ surprise assault on October 7 reveals that the base’s defense system was unprepared for a large-scale infiltration and assault. Eight soldiers and commanders were killed defending the camp, with additional troops wounded.

The findings show that Camp Urim was not the terrorists’ original target; they arrived there by mistake en route to attacking a nearby intelligence base. The operational probe reviewed the course of events, combat management, and the conduct of security forces during the infiltration and complex fighting, which took place as Camp Urim became one of dozens of simultaneous attack points.

The unprecedented scale of the infiltration — thousands of terrorists breaching dozens of locations simultaneously, including military installations where the fighting was extensive — was a central reason for the delayed reinforcement to civilian areas and fighting zones.

Base Structure and Initial Readiness

Camp Urim, near Kibbutz Urim and about 16 km from the Gaza border, hosts three units: the Southern District of the Home Front Command, the Border Defense Battalion 414, and an intelligence unit. Each had a standby squad for guard duty. On the morning of the attack, the Home Front Command’s standby squad had seven guards, six of them armed.

Timeline of the Attack

At 06:29, Hamas launched a massive rocket barrage at southern Israel and the nation’s interior. Terrorists breached the border fence at dozens of points, using vehicles, motorcycles, and on foot, placing the entire sector under a well-coordinated assault within minutes.

At the onset of the attack, 10 terrorists on 5 motorcycles crossed into Israeli territory and moved toward the Urim military compound. Simultaneously, two female soldiers changing guard shifts at the Southern District base entry post entered a shelter due to incoming rocket alerts (“Red Alert”) and remained there until they were rescued at 12:30 PM. Another soldier entered the weapons storage shelter, while the remaining soldiers at the district base sheltered near the female dorms. The operations room soldier began managing the event, and by 06:36, three additional operators joined. Due to continuing alerts, the duty commander instructed all guards via WhatsApp to remain in protected areas. At 06:42, the district commander ordered all staff to report to the base to manage the rocket fire incidents. Several commanders left their homes, but two were intercepted and wounded by terrorists en route.

Terrorists breach the base

At 07:26, an explosive device was detonated on the fence of the Home Front Command base, breaching the gate and allowing terrorists to infiltrate. Moments later, the operations room soldiers spotted the breach on security cameras and declared a confirmed enemy infiltration, ordering the standby squad to respond immediately. Concurrently, a noncommissioned officer and another operator locked the blast doors at the entrance to the regional command post, where the control room was based.

At 07:29, the standby squad and two operations room soldiers ran from the shelter near the dorms toward the control room. A terrorist squad spotted them and opened fire. Two female soldiers were killed, two others wounded but continued running toward the control room, and the rest retreated to the dorms, some injured. The terrorists proceeded to the weapons storage shelter where a lone soldier was hiding; they shot and killed him. Around the same time, the district operations officer called for the standby squad from the 414th Battalion to assist. The terrorists then entrenched themselves near the weapons shelter to plan their next move.

At 07:33, the district’s training and resources officer arrived unarmed at the main gate. Around this time, power to the base failed, and the gate system became inoperative. The officer left the base and drove to the Dor Alon station at the Urim junction. Meanwhile, the 414th Battalion deployed a drone over the base to locate the terrorists.

At 07:39, a terrorist fired another round at one of the previously fallen female soldiers and stole her weapon. The district commander again ordered all soldiers to regroup at the command post. At 07:44, the 414th Battalion drone located the terrorists.

At 07:49, the terrorist commander split his squad, taking three terrorists toward the female dorms. After setting fire to the duty commander’s car, the terrorists reached the emergency warehouses and opened fire on the doors. During this time, one of the operations room soldiers called out to the terrorists from the command post, demanding they leave the base. Minutes later, the terrorists returned to the weapons shelter to finalize their next attack plan.

At 08:02, the terrorists fired an RPG at the Regional Command Post, hitting the conference room window. They then advanced toward the post and the Human Resources building, shooting at a reservist officer who had arrived at the district gate. The officer was injured and retreated.

At 08:05, the terrorists noticed the main entrance door to the post was left open. They threw a grenade into the entryway and tried to open the first iron door but failed. They continued circling the building, attempting to access the eastern entrance. Inside the command center, a systems NCO stood armed at the doorway to protect the female soldiers.

At 08:14, the terrorists breached the first iron door and entered the reception area. A minute later, they opened the second door and shot the systems NCO, who was killed in action. They tossed a grenade inside the Regional Command Post, but it failed to detonate.

Around 08:15, a force from the 414th Battalion broke through the fence separating the Home Front Command base from the battalion’s base. The force split into three teams and positioned themselves strategically.

At 08:17, one team, led by the deputy commander of the protection company, took position on the roof of the ‘Daniel’ Reserve Brigade’s control center, directing the battle from there. The terrorists threw several more grenades into the Matzpam while the female soldiers inside took cover. The duty commander handed her weapon to one of the soldiers, and both aimed their rifles at the entrance door. One grenade exploded outside the command room door, but the soldiers were unharmed.

At 08:19, the terrorists entered the Matzpam through the second door, shooting out the security cameras. Meanwhile, the district commander arrived at the base perimeter and ran toward the gate with the district’s senior NCO.

At 08:24, the terrorists breached the command room door. The soldiers inside returned fire, but after a brief exchange, the terrorists threw a grenade into the room. The blast disabled all command systems. The terrorists then stormed the room, shooting at the soldiers inside. Three female soldiers were killed, and two others wounded. The terrorists proceeded to search the command post for classified military information and exited at 08:29.

Reinforcements and Final Assault

Between 08:30-10:40, additional IDF units arrive, including troops from Battalion 414, the Counter-Terrorism School, and elite reconnaissance forces.

Multiple terrorists are eliminated inside the base and in surrounding shelters.

10:40: The battle ends. Soldiers begin clearing and securing the area, rescuing wounded personnel.

Key Findings and Lessons

Defense Concept Deficiency: The defense concept of the base was built around addressing the threat of infiltration, but did not account for the actuality of an infiltration or an attack by such a large number of terrorists. As a result, the guarding forces at the base had never been trained for such a scenario, and existing drills were limited to “case-and-response” formats for small, localized incidents.

Communication and Command Failures: From 07:31, when the first update on the infiltration into the base was received, until the end of the fighting, all updates regarding the enemy’s status were conducted only at the commanders’ level and through direct phone calls. No general alert was issued on any platform regarding the terrorists’ infiltration into the base. As a result, during the battle, personnel from the district continued arriving at the base unaware of the ongoing events and without any operational plan.

Manpower Shortage: Only 7 of 12 required security posts were manned; no guards were on duty when the attack began.

The investigation team concluded that the camp’s defensive infrastructure must be upgraded, the base defense file must be updated to include all possible scenarios, and a clear procedure must be established for on-duty personnel in the event of an infiltration. Additionally, the number of armed personnel at the base should be increased and their weapon proficiency improved. The three adjacent units should enhance joint training and mutual support in complex situations. Furthermore, the operational coordination between the Southern District of the Home Front Command and the Gaza Division and Southern Brigade should be strengthened.

The investigation team determined that the base’s defense infrastructure must be significantly improved. The camp’s defense protocol must be updated to address all potential scenarios, including a defined chain of actions for duty officers in the event of a base infiltration. It was also recommended to increase the number of armed personnel on site and enhance their operational proficiency. Joint drills between the three neighboring units should be intensified to ensure coordinated response in complex incidents. Additionally, the operational coordination between the Home Front Command’s Southern District, the Gaza Division, and the Southern Brigade must be strengthened.

The team also commended the courage of the commanders and female soldiers in the command center, the camaraderie shown by the other soldiers present at the base during the battle, and the determination of the commanders and fighters who engaged the terrorists and assisted in the fighting within the base.

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