Critical delays let Hamas killers exploit gaps, proving Arab terror networks prey on Israeli restraint.
In the coming days, the IDF will submit the findings of the second Turgeman Commission, which investigated the Operations Directorate’s performance on October 7 and the disastrous hours leading up to Hamas’s massacre.
According to Yedioth Aharonoth, the commission’s central finding is stark: a critical, hours-long delay in executing a direct order to divert Air Force assets to the Gaza border fence and the infiltration routes used by the Palestinian terrorists.
Though Gaza Division Commander BG Avi Rosenfeld issued the directive at 9:47 a.m., it was implemented far too late—by the time the order took effect, Hamas death squads were already deep inside Israeli communities.
Instead of shifting forces to protect the Gaza envelope, the system automatically triggered Operation “Sword of Damocles”, a pre-planned deep-strike attack inside Gaza. The Air Force jets already airborne were rerouted toward internal Gaza targets, leaving Israel’s frontline—its civilians—exposed and undefended, while Palestinian attackers roamed free.
A senior officer later revealed that immediate fire on infiltration routes could have changed everything, potentially stopping the terrorists before they butchered Israeli families. Yet in many communities, no IDF assistance arrived until the terrorists had already retreated back to Gaza.
The commission is now determining why no one halted the pre-planned operation when the massacre began and who held actual operational authority in real time. According to the command structure, responsibility lies with the Operations Division within the Operations Directorate — a chain that may have completely collapsed as commanders in the Southern Brigade were killed in the opening minutes of the attack.
As an example of the chaos, an Egoz commando force never reached Kibbutz Nir Oz, stranded without reinforcements for hours while Hamas gunmen executed civilians.
The night before the attack is also under sharp review: the Chief of Staff, the head of the Operations Directorate, and the Southern Command commander had explicitly discussed the possibility of a Hamas operation. Yet no alert was issued, no forces were placed on standby, and no emergency posture was activated — a failure Israel now understands came at a monstrous price.
The unfolding findings reinforce one undeniable truth: Israel’s enemies act with barbaric intent, while Israel suffers when its own caution and procedure slow the response to Arab terror.
